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1 Introduction 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, in addition to the financial crisis that fol-
lowed, highlighted weaknesses in global financial markets that required regulatory ac-
tion. The crisis had exposed significant flaws in the European regulatory framework 
and as a result, the European Commission launched a consultation on its proposed 
reforms of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC), here-
after referred to as MiFID (European Commission, 2014a). The new framework consist-
ing of an implementing directive and regulation, MiFID II (Directive 2014/65/EU), is set 
to replace the current MiFID framework in January 2018 (European Commission, 
2016). The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (Regulation No 648/2012), 
hereafter referred to as EMIR, was designed to mitigate risk in the notoriously opaque 
over-the-counter (OTC) markets (European Commission, 2014b). EMIR entered into 
force in August 2012 (European Commission, 2014b). The European Union tends to 
deal with reforms in separate legislative proposals, hence its ‘salami-slicing’ approach 
to regulation (European Union Committee, 2015), consequently two regulations; MiFID 
II and EMIR primarily constitute the post-financial crisis derivatives oversight across the 
EU.  
 
Simultaneously, regulatory action to prevent another financial crisis was taken in the 
United States in the form of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (Public Law 111-203), hereafter referred to as Dodd-Frank, which was signed 
into federal law in July 2010 (SEC, 2011). Standard and Poor’s has estimated that the 
compliance costs of Dodd-Frank, the largest financial reform bill in history, for the eight 
largest US banks alone would cost up to $34 billion annually (McCloskey, 2012). The 
overhaul of regulation of derivatives markets is the most evident area of common 
ground between MiFID II and Dodd-Frank (European Commission, 2011). EMIR espe-
cially has a lot in common with Dodd-Frank, such as moving trading onto more trans-
parent platforms, increasing the resilience of central counterparties and strengthening 
investor protection (EY, 2014).  
 
The current regulatory limbo in the EU can be contrasted with the US where Dodd-
Frank has been addressing similar issues since 2010 (Hart and Marlow, 2016). MiFID II 
is an ambitious directive not only for its broad scope and complexity but also for its 
timetable for implementation. Therefore it did not come as a surprise that in February 
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2016, the European Commission proposed a one-year extension to the entry into ap-
plication of MiFID II, which was to be implemented in January 2017 (European Com-
mission, 2016). The January 2018 target date would evidently mean that it has taken 
nearly a decade to implement the regulatory framework across the European Economic 
Area. An extension was regarded as necessary in order to avoid legal uncertainty and 
potential market disruption (European Commission, 2016). According to Sands (2016), 
the delay to ‘’impossible’’ MiFID II deadline results in leaving advisers in limbo, as they 
are expected to prepare for the implementation of the directive while they are waiting 
for more information.  
 
In contrast, global companies continue to move forward with Dodd-Frank requirements, 
attending to issues concerning the execution of OTC derivative contracts on electronic 
trading platforms in addition to post-trade transparency and position limits for commodi-
ty derivatives. MiFID II will also address these issues but not until January 2018, as-
suming that there are no further delays. It is therefore thought that the US has a head 
start, as most of the US regime will be in place prior to MiFID II whereas EMIR only 
addresses the regulation of derivatives, which will be further extended when MiFID II is 
implemented. However, the first-mover status of the US has created problems, as 
barely any time was given to coordination and cooperation with non-US legislators due 
to the speed at which the legislation was created (ISDA, 2015a). As a result, differ-
ences in both the implementation schedules and the content of the regulation across 
different jurisdictions have emerged (ISDA, 2015a). According to the European Com-
mission (2011), US regulation is nevertheless more developed in areas such as the 
regulation of commodity derivative markets, allowing for Europe to catch up through the 
more detailed revision of MiFID. The ambiguity that surrounded EMIR has encouraged 
banks to be better informed and ready for MiFID II; however, the implementation of 
MiFID II is set to be a bigger challenge for the banks than either Dodd-Frank or EMIR 
(Bloomberg, 2015a).  
 
Like Dodd-Frank in the US, EMIR and MiFID II are the legislative measures through 
which the EU implements various measures intended to meet the 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh 
commitment (see Appendix 1) to regulate the OTC derivatives market in order to en-
hance transparency and mitigate risk (PwC, 2013). In line with the G-20 commitments, 
MiFID II seeks to improve market transparency by moving derivatives trading from the 
opaque bilateral OTC market to exchange trading whereas EMIR aims to improve mar-
ket stability and reduce counterparty risk in the derivatives market (Chaudhry, 2015). 
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This thesis will examine the measures taken by the US and the EU in their pursuit to 
increase transparency, with emphasis on derivatives, and to mitigate systemic risk in 
order to meet the 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh commitments. Furthermore, the consequences 
of increased regulation will be discussed in the context of EMIR, MiFID II and Dodd-
Frank. The literature review in the following chapter will discuss these issues in more 
detail.   
 
The following research questions have been defined for this study: 
 
1. To identify the importance of increasing transparency and mitigating systemic risk in 
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis  
2. To establish both the reach and importance of the US and the EU derivatives re-
gimes in a global context  
3. To determine whether or not Dodd-Frank, EMIR and MiFID II bring the US and the 
EU one step closer to extending transparency requirements and reducing systemic 
risk. 
2 Literature Review 
The main focus of this chapter is to outline the debates concerning the measures 
adopted by the EU and the US to increase transparency and reduce systemic risk, pri-
marily in the context of derivatives markets. In doing so, it will demonstrate what the 
pursuit to meet these objectives has resulted in so far and assess whether or not these 
goals are realistically achievable under the current regulations. Dodd-Frank, EMIR and 
MiFID II, in line with the 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh commitments, have divergent implica-
tions for global markets and market players, which is why each market participant 
views them in a different light. Due to identical objectives but dissimilar ways to achieve 
them, these measures result in unintended consequences, such as regulatory arbi-
trage, and stand out as the key reasons to harmonise the US-EU derivatives market, 
which is the final theme discussed in this literature review.  
2.1 Global Need to Increase Transparency 
 
It can be argued that the financial crisis of 2008 was not merely caused by reckless 
lending and excessive risk taking; the fundamental problem was a lack of transparency 
(Denning, 2013). The crisis demonstrated that financial markets had become danger-
ously opaque, allowing for unnecessary risks to build and be transferred across differ-
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ent financial sectors (Friedlander, 2015). Friedlander (2015) argues that few realised 
how concentrated the derivatives market truly was and neither market participants nor 
regulators were fully aware of the interconnections between the biggest banks. This 
view is corroborated by Denning (2013), according to whom after the collapse of Leh-
man Brothers, it was impossible to understand a particular bank’s risks from derivative 
trading, hence no bank desired to lend to or trade with any other bank. Therefore, in 
the wake of the financial crisis, the extension of transparency stands out as a global 
theme. The extension of transparency in Dodd-Frank, among other related legislative 
frameworks, is limited to derivative markets, whereas MiFID II will introduce the exten-
sion of transparency principles that are used in quoted equity markets to nearly all OTC 
markets, which some market participants argue is excessive (Bloomberg, 2016). Only 
the EU has chosen to extend these provisions to the cash bond market, showing that 
Europe is going one step further in its transparency requirements. Although the idea of 
increased transparency is commendable, it is argued that the practicalities of not only 
implementing but also working with new trading models may end up being more com-
plex and costly than originally anticipated (Achkar, 2016). Whereas previously very little 
reporting was necessary and post-trade activities were clearly understood in OTC trad-
ing, reporting requirements and post-trading arrangements are now ironically less clear 
(Achkar, 2016). To elaborate, it is now unclear where, by when, and by whom these 
trades will be reported (Achkar, 2016).  
 
Furthermore, market participants in Europe fear that the more vigorous regulations of 
MiFID II may encourage investors to take their money elsewhere (Bloomberg, 2016). 
This is due to MiFID II treating various illiquid bonds as liquid, hence triggering pre-
trade transparency and quote regulations (Bloomberg, 2016). Consequently it is argued 
that this means that trading will become more difficult. The head of fixed-income trad-
ing at Deutsche Asset and Wealth Management, Juan Landazabal, professed that 
transparency is a “double-edged sword” (Bloomberg, 2016). Landazabal criticised the 
new rule for creating situations in which promising investment opportunities have to be 
left behind because there is not enough liquidity to put the trades on (Bloomberg, 
2015b). Landazabal also contrasts the scale of post-trade rules introduced by MiFID II 
with that of the US, which decided to approach the issue more gradually and does not 
report the full size of trades (Bloomberg, 2015b). It can therefore be argued that exces-
sive market transparency may result in harming the very people it has been designed 
to protect, as too much transparency may limit competition and increase transaction 
costs for consumers.  
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Five years after its implementation, Dodd-Frank has created some level of transparen-
cy and oversight of derivatives. Standardised derivatives must now be centrally cleared 
and either traded on exchanges or transparent trading platforms (Friedlander, 2015). 
Approximately 75 per-cent of the transactions in the swaps market, measured by no-
tional amount, are now cleared (Waters, 2015). By contrast, in December 2007 only 
around 15 per-cent of these transactions were cleared (Waters, 2015). According to 
Friedlander (2015), these reforms have increased transparency while decreasing the 
level of risk and unclear interconnections between companies. However, only approxi-
mately 18 per-cent of single-name credit default swaps (CDS), in terms of gross no-
tional value, were cleared in September 2014 (Waters, 2015). Although this is an in-
crease from 2009, when only 5 per-cent of CDS were cleared (Waters, 2015), it can be 
argued that this is quite poor considering that the excessively risky CDS market is sup-
posed to be one of the most heavily regulated areas after the financial crisis. Currently 
there are also four swaps data repositories (SDRs) established by Dodd-Frank, which 
are expected to make the previously opaque market more transparent (Waters, 2015). 
It is also pointed out that transparency in the OTC derivatives market has not ‘’reached 
its full potential’’ in terms of meeting the G-20 commitments (King and Pagliocca, 
2015). The primary barriers to meeting these commitments are claimed to be the lack 
of global cooperation, the lack of global data standards and legal barriers to global data 
sharing among regulators (King and Pagliocca, 2015). While global cooperation is cru-
cial in increasing transparency, it should not stand out as the only reason as to why 
Dodd-Frank has failed in this respect, like the authors claim. Therefore this statement 
creates a strong sense of blame-shifting, regardless of the fact that global cooperation 
is most likely the only way to meet the global need to increase transparency.  
2.2 Defining Systemic Risk  
 
There is no universal agreement on the definition of systemic risk. However, a common 
factor in most definitions of systemic risk is that a trigger event, such as an economic 
shock or institutional failure, causes a chain of bad economic consequences, similar to 
the domino effect (Schwarcz, 2008). Edward Kane (2010) claims that official definitions 
of systemic risk exclude the role of government officials in generating it. Kane argues 
that official definitions lead to an insufficient diagnosis of its origin: defective risk man-
agement of ‘difficult to fail and unwind’ companies. To elaborate, the diagnosis is not 
sufficient because it overlooks the opportunity of exploiting gaps in policy-making and 
thus undermines the accountability of regulatory mistakes (Kane, 2010). Despite differ-
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ences in the official definition, a systemic risk event in the financial services would un-
doubtedly have an unpredictable impact on the economy, which is why the threat of 
systemic risk receives massive attention from both regulators and governments 
(McConnell and Blacker, 2013). Systemic risk has been argued to be one of most im-
portant issues during and after the financial crisis because should one counterparty 
default on its obligations, this will have a domino effect across all counterparties in the 
OTC derivatives market (Jones Day, 2013). The clearing requirement of EMIR is antic-
ipated to mitigate the risks of the domino effect through centralising risk within Central 
Counterparties (Jones Day, 2013). 
2.3 Too Big to Fail – Too Big to Punish?  
 
Alan Newman (2016) has stated that high levels of notional values of derivatives are 
equivalent to high systemic risk, and the biggest banks account for virtually all out-
standing notional derivatives values. In order to mitigate systemic risk, policy-makers in 
both the US and the EU have started to target big banks. When Dodd-Frank was cre-
ated, it was expected to end institutions from becoming “too big to fail.” According to 
Alan Greenspan, “if they are too big to fail, they are too big” (Dealbook, 2009). Howev-
er, the top five banks still constitute 92 per-cent of the US derivatives market, worth 
$220 trillion at face value (Levinson, 2015). In addition, evidence shows that smaller 
banks have suffered as a result of the legislation, which has essentially been unsuc-
cessful in its pursuit to end institutions that are too big to fail (Lux and Greene, 2015).  
 
According to a study conducted by Harvard Kennedy School for Business and Gov-
ernment in 2015, Dodd-Frank did not succeed in mitigating concerns over banking sec-
tor concentration. This study suggests that the top five bank holding companies control 
practically as many banking assets as they did in the fiscal quarter prior to Dodd-
Frank’s passage (Lux and Greene, 2015). Simultaneously community banks with $1 
billion or less in assets have been in decline, as have larger community banks but to a 
less drastic extent (Lux and Greene, 2015). This study contained data by the FDIC’s 
Statistics on Depositary Institutions quarterly dataset and the files were last updated in 
August 2014 (Lux and Greene, 2015). This study was conducted by aggregating the 
data at the holding company level in order to portray the total assets held by the largest 
financial institutions more adequately (Lux and Greene, 2015). The five biggest banks 
in the study refer to the five largest each quarter using overall asset size and a $10 
billion total assets threshold was used to determine whether or not a bank could be 
classified as a community bank (Lux and Greene, 2015). Although one of the key ob-
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jectives of Dodd-Frank was to end the too big to fail, there has been a sudden consoli-
dation away from community banks post-Dodd-Frank, suggesting that this attempt has 
had an adverse effect. This is primarily caused by increased compliance costs incurred 
by a heightened regulatory burden, which larger banks are more suited to handle than 
smaller banks. Hence Dodd-Frank has resulted in a more concentrated financial indus-
try with fewer banks that are no longer too big to fail, but too big to save (Lewitt, 2015). 
Lux and Greene (2015) argue that although Dodd-Frank intended to help consumers, it 
has only succeeded in achieving the opposite, as costs are passed on to consumers 
and consolidation has reduced both choice and proximity. Therefore, instead of provid-
ing more competition in terms of service and price, consumers have been left with few-
er providers (Morrissey, 2015).  
 
However, according to Greg Ip (2016), it should be pointed out that size leads to signif-
icant benefits in banking, such as economies of scale in technology, branding and risk 
management. These factors attract customers in addition to geographic and sectoral 
diversity (Ip, 2016). It can therefore be argued that if regulators overlook these aspects 
and are solely preoccupied by the danger of size; they might risk leaving the economy 
worse off, instead of better. A 2014 report by the Bipartisan Policy Center notes that 
these benefits are not insignificant and regulators should weigh the benefits of size 
against the risks that big banks become too big to fail (Ip, 2016). Ip (2016) also claims 
that while big banks make mistakes, it does not automatically mean that they are more 
likely to fail. In fact, size incurs greater diversification across regions, industries and 
business lines, and therefore less volatile revenue (Ip, 2016). It can also be debated 
that the American economy would not even exist without the five biggest banks given 
that they account for 42 per-cent of all loans outstanding in the US while the six biggest 
banks are in control of 67 per-cent of all banking assets (Gandel, 2013). According to 
SNL Financial, the six largest banks in the US hold 67 per-cent of all the assets in the 
financial system, which is $6.9 trillion and has increased by 37 per-cent from five years 
ago (Gandel, 2013).  
 
John Riley (2016) argues that it is not only the US that is playing with fire. Deutsche 
Bank, the too big to fail of Germany, has approximately €55 trillion euros of derivatives 
according to Bloomberg and Deutsche Bank. Meanwhile Germany’s GDP is “merely” 
€2.7 trillion, making Deutsche Bank’s derivatives exposure 20 times the GDP of Ger-
many (Riley, 2016), although Germany is supposed to represent the strongest and 
most stable regulatory oversight in Europe. Lewitt (2015) has even claimed that 
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Deutsche Bank carries the biggest systemic risk of any financial institution. Lewitt 
(2015) forecasts that when the next market dislocation arrives, derivatives will earn 
again their reputation as financial weapons of mass destruction. The situation with 
Deutsche Bank also raises political questions, because if Deutsche Bank were to fail 
and the German government bailed it out, this would be contrasted with the recent is-
sues in Greece, Spain and Portugal. However, if the German government chose not to 
act on this, the whole Eurozone would be impacted.  
2.4 Derivatives Markets in the US and the EU  
 
Thirteen years ago, Warren Buffett famously described derivatives as financial weap-
ons of mass destruction, which carry dangers that, while now latent, are potentially 
lethal. In 2015, Buffett reaffirmed his view but also noted that this does not mean that 
derivatives cannot be used intelligently, for instance, in terms of hedging input costs 
(Boyd, 2015). After the financial crisis, one of the most difficult tasks for market regula-
tors has been finding an agreement on how global derivatives should be overseen 
across borders. According to the European Union Committee, the OTC derivatives 
market was too complex and opaque; and both market participants and regulators have 
underestimated counterparty risk in a market that is dominated by a small number of 
large international banks and dealers (Jones Day, 2013). According to the BIS, the total 
OTC derivatives notional outstanding was $691.5 trillion in 2014 (ISDA, 2015a). OTC 
trading is generally more popular than trading on an exchange and it allows the coun-
terparty greater flexibility by notoriously enabling more privacy between counterparties 
regarding reporting requirements (Jones Day, 2013).  
 
Europe is called the “poor cousin” of the United States in terms of exchange-traded 
equity derivatives, and equity derivatives trading in Europe remains relatively low, 
whereas the US has experienced sudden growth (The Trade, 2015). According to BIS, 
European exchange-traded turnover was $17 trillion in 2014 compared to $80 trillion in 
the US due to factors such as insufficient liquidity, market fragmentation, lower risk 
appetite from banks in addition to increased regulation, which have contributed to the 
lack of growth of European equity derivatives (The Trade, 2015). According to Lauri 
Rosendahl, head of European cash equities and equity derivatives, global trading and 
market services at Nasdaq, it is clear that the US market is more developed (The 
Trade, 2015). Rosendahl also claims that the US is ahead of Europe in the clearing 
mandate and electronic trading, both of which have supported equity derivative vol-
umes (The Trade, 2015). Furthermore, one of the major problems restraining European 
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equity derivatives growth has been the fragmentation across its markets. Whereas Eu-
rope’s primary derivatives exchanges, such as Eurex, Euronext, ICE Futures Europe 
and Nasdaq operate under different rules across the continent, the US has several 
venues for equity derivatives trading and users are able to trade the same instrument 
across all exchanges without the possibility of a currency mismatch (The Trade, 2015).  
 
The derivatives markets have always been global markets in order to benefit end users 
(ISDA, 2015a). However, analysis conducted by the International Swaps and Deriva-
tives Association (ISDA) suggests that after the Swap Execution Facility (SEF) launch 
in the United States in October 2013, most non-US platforms decided not to register 
with US regulators and these venues closed to US participants (Basar, 2016). As Eu-
ropean dealers shifted away from the US, liquidity in the interest rate swap market 
fragmented geographically (Basar, 2016). By contrast, in the case of margin rules for 
non-cleared derivatives, a number of discrepancies have emerged in national-level 
proposals, which, in some cases, could put firms operating in the US at a competitive 
disadvantage internationally and reduce choice for US end users domestically 
(O’Malia, 2015). Dodd-Frank should not apply to activities outside the United States, 
unless those activities have a direct and significant connection with the activities in or 
effect on the commerce of the United States. The CFTC’s cross-border guidance, how-
ever, takes a more extensive approach in order to capture activities overseas (O’Malia, 
2015). Consequently, non-US companies have turned away from all trade or counter-
parties that would ensue them being subject to US regulatory oversight in addition to 
their own jurisdiction’s rules (O’Malia, 2015), in order to avoid double compliance. Ac-
cording to ISDA research, 87.7 % of regional European interdealer volume in euro in-
terest rate swaps was traded between European dealers in Q4 of 2014, compared with 
73.4 % of Q3 in 2013 (O’Malia, 2015). This change in trading behaviour occurred when 
the SEF rules were introduced. As many non-US platforms did not register with the 
CFTC as SEFs, US traders were no longer able to access liquidity on these platforms. 
For instance, US entities were not able to access the most liquid pool for euro interest 
rate swaps, which is based in Europe and away from SEFs (O’Malia, 2015).  
2.5 US-EU Harmonisation  
 
According to interviews conducted by Deloitte (2016), asset managers fear that MiFID 
II may result in making the European Union less attractive for investment management 
activities concerning the market structure, transparency and investment research rules 
under the revised directive. MiFID II will essentially change how investment managers 
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interact with the market, as the new regulatory framework introduces the definition of 
an OTF for non-equities in addition to pre-and post-trade transparency requirements 
concerning liquid bonds (Bloomberg, 2015c). At the extreme, some investment manag-
ers believe that MiFID II will disrupt market liquidity to such an extent that it will drive 
investment out of the European Union, hence corporates would rather issue outside the 
European Union (Deloitte, 2015). With that being said, none of the companies inter-
viewed by Deloitte are actively planning to relocate outside the European Union due to 
MiFID II and its requirements, although some conceded that they would keep it under 
consideration. Furthermore, ESMA proposes that asset managers either have to pay 
for research out of their own revenues or alternatively set up a specific research ac-
count for each of their clients (Bloomberg, 2015b). Asset managers have responded to 
this by arguing that the new measure would result in a decrease in the production of 
research in addition to making it impossible for smaller fund managers to access re-
search, thus making the European Union less competitive globally (Bloomberg, 2015b). 
It is expected that factors such as competition and increased transparency of costs and 
charges will prevent investment managers from passing the costs on to investors 
(Deloitte, 2015). As a result, MiFID II would have the impact of increasing the costs of 
doing business and reducing margins. However, there is currently an abundance of 
fees that are not transparent to the investor, especially in the bond market. Although 
MiFID II will require for this information to be provided to the investor, it is highly likely 
that costs and charges will be passed on to consumers, as companies are not willing to 
reduce margins (Bloomberg, 2015c). According to PwC (2012), sell-side firms may 
pass on higher trading costs to buy-side firms, which will increase the cost of doing 
business for asset managers, unless they can pass these costs on to their clients. As a 
result, Europe would become less attractive to investors. Jeff Sprecher, the chief exec-
utive officer of Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), warns that the New York of Europe, 
London “risks losing its position as the world’s leading centre for derivatives trading 
amid an onslaught of new European regulations” (Jenkins and Stafford, 2015). Accord-
ing to Sprecher, business was already moving towards the US and Asia, and this shift 
would speed up unless the EU repressed its new rules, including MiFID II.  Sprecher 
also points out that while the US the EU have similar rules on derivatives trading, Mi-
FID II will add an additional layer of European regulation. As a result, Europe immedi-
ately becomes non-competitive, claims Sprecher.  
 
The lack of international harmonisation of regulations between the US and the EU has 
resulted in regulatory arbitrage, primarily to avoid double compliance. For instance in 
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Spring 2015, traders and analysts in the swaps markets noticed that hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars of trades by US banks has disappeared (Levinson, 2015). In reality, the 
largest US banks had altered a few key words in swaps contracts in addition to shifting 
other trades to affiliates based in London that had a more lenient regime (Levinson, 
2015). Due to a loophole in swaps regulations, these affiliates remain outside the juris-
diction of US regulators (Levinson, 2015).  As a result of post-crisis regulations, the US 
derivatives market has shrunk although it remains large with outstanding contracts 
worth $220 trillion at face value (Levinson, 2015). The American and European jurisdic-
tions account for approximately 80 per-cent of global derivatives markets (Deutsche 
Bank, 2013), which is estimated to be worth $553 trillion (Brush and Verlaine, 2016), 
making their rules extremely influential not only across the transatlantic but all over the 
world. Each side has argued that its rules on derivatives trading are better than the 
other’s at fighting systemic risk while also minimising the impact on the banks’ own 
trades (Stafford and Brunsden, 2016). According to CFTC commissioner J Christopher 
Giancarlo, the impasse had been contrary to the cooperative spirit of the 2009 G-20 
Pittsburgh commitments, as the intent previously was to increase the regulatory juris-
diction of the CFTC rather than to insulate US markets from systemic risk (Keating, 
2016). 
 
However, traders have warned that the existing gap in financial markets regulation 
could potentially fracture global derivatives trading, which American and European reg-
ulators have finally agreed to close after 4 years of dispute (Stafford and Brunsden, 
2016). A 2015 ISDA study has found that US-EU harmonisation of derivatives markets 
is crucial because divergent regulations across jurisdictions may ultimately lead to the 
fragmentation and regionalisation of liquidity pools (ISDA, 2015b). According to Scott 
O’Malia, fragmentation signifies less liquidity, less choice and, ultimately, higher costs 
for end users (ISDA, 2015b). Under the new deal, the US will align itself with stricter 
EU rules concerning rules on margin of clearing houses. By contrast, the EU has 
agreed that customers of clearing houses have to post more margin in order to move in 
line with stricter US standards (EurActiv, 2016). A common approach is undoubtedly 
absolutely essential as it means that EU CCPs can operate in the US markets and vice 
versa on a level playing field (EurActiv, 2016). Jeff Sprecher, chief executive of Inter-
continental Exchange, who has previously criticised EU regulations for being too ex-
cessive, said in a statement that the agreement is a significant milestone in regulatory 
oversight (Brush and Verlaine, 2016). This agreement is set to end the trans-Atlantic 
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dispute concerning derivatives and Scott O’Malia is hopeful that this ensures that other 
equivalence decisions will be taken in the future (Brush and Verlaine, 2016). 
2.6 Literature Summary  
 
Having now looked at the US and the EU approaches to the post-crisis regulation of 
financial markets, the literature review can be summarised as follows. First and fore-
most, Dodd-Frank has more or less failed in its attempt to increase transparency 
whereas in Europe, the extension of transparency has mainly resulted in confusion 
rather than any measurable benefits. In addition, several views have suggested that 
Dodd-Frank has failed in reducing systemic risk in the context of the too big to fail 
banks, as they still continue to hold nearly as much notional value in derivatives as they 
did before Dodd-Frank was implemented. The impact of this on consumers is contro-
versial, as Lux and Greene (2015) argued that consumers have been left with a reduc-
tion in choice and proximity. Ip (2016), on the other hand, claimed that size leads to 
benefits and trying to punish big banks may leave the economy worse off than it was to 
begin with. While Ip argued that the fact that the banks are big does not automatically 
mean that they are more likely to fail, if they do in fact fail, it would have a massive im-
pact on the entire market, as the five biggest US banks control 92 per-cent of the de-
rivatives market. Furthermore, the need for cooperation between the US and the EU 
regulators has been identified as a continuous theme in the literature. It is expected 
that the forthcoming US-EU harmonisation will improve the regulation of the derivatives 
market across both jurisdictions whilst reducing issues arising from divergent regimes. 
In the next chapter the methodology will be introduced.  
3 Methodology 
The literature review has clearly identified gaps in determining whether the US truly is 
ahead of the EU in derivatives oversight. Although the notional amount big US banks 
hold in derivatives was established, there was a gap in determining their individual de-
rivatives exposure and whether or not it has changed before, during and after the im-
plementation of Dodd-Frank. In addition, the literature review has identified a gap in the 
measurement of increased transparency. These issues will be looked at in the results 
chapter. The rest of this chapter will evaluate different methodologies and provide a 
justification for the one chosen for this research project in addition to describing the 
data collection and analysis process. Finally, limitations to the study will be outlined 
alongside areas for future research.  
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3.1 Research Approach  
 
The deductive approach was primarily followed throughout this research project. Saun-
ders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) define this approach as the development of a theory 
that is subsequently tested through a series of propositions. The research started with 
theory developed from a review of academic literature, after which a research strategy 
was designed in order to test the theory, corroborating that this research project fol-
lowed the deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2012). The deductive approach in-
volves explaining causal relationships between concepts and variables (Saunders et 
al., 2012). The alternative approach would have been to begin by collecting data in 
order to explore a phenomenon, resulting in the formulation of a theory. This is known 
as the inductive approach, and it has been criticised for not allowing alternative expla-
nations to what has happened (Saunders et al., 2012). By contrast, a deductive ap-
proach allows for other theories to be suggested. A deductive approach was decided 
more suitable for this particular research topic, as it involved going from the general to 
the specific and involved the exploration of causal relationships. Deductive reasoning 
often begins with an established theory and seeks to discover if the theory applies to 
specific instances (Hyde, 2000). This was a more suitable approach for a research top-
ic that involved a lot of technical detail that could not have been adequately examined 
without seeing the bigger picture first.  
 
Furthermore, a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods was used 
in order to achieve the stated research objectives. For a research project requiring na-
tional or international comparisons, secondary data generally provides the principal 
source to address the research questions (Saunders et al., 2012). According to Stewart 
and Kamins (1993), using secondary data gives an advantage compared with re-
searches using primary data, as the data can be evaluated prior to using it, enabling 
the rejection of unsuitable data sooner rather than later. 
3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Mostly secondary qualitative data was used in this research. Qualitative data sources 
ranging from academic journals to official publications and the financial press were 
used in order to capture a broad and diverse overview of the topic. The qualitative data 
collection process identified gaps in the research topic, which is why quantitative data 
was used in order to fill these gaps and meet the research objectives. Quantitative data 
in its raw form is not an effective measure of conveying information to the majority of 
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readers, which is why it is crucial to process and analyse it in order to turn it into useful 
information (Saunders et al., 2012). Consequently, quantitative analysis techniques, 
such as charts and graphs (Saunders et al., 2012), were used to present the data in a 
more descriptive way.  
 
In order to test the transparency of derivatives trading and clearing, the largest deriva-
tives exchanges in the US and the EU were identified and examined. Consequently, 
daily statistics for the same day disclosed by the three largest derivatives exchanges, 
CME Group, Intercontinental Exchange and Eurex, were used in order to test the 
transparency of derivatives clearing across the US and the EU jurisdictions. In the case 
of Eurex, the increase in the clearing of OTC interest rate swaps was calculated based 
on the statistical data Eurex provided on their website. In order to test the second hy-
pothesis, OCC’s (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) Quarterly Reports on Bank 
Trading and Derivatives Activities between 2009 and 2015 were examined to establish 
the derivatives exposures of the five biggest US banks. Q4 reports with statistics as of 
31 December were used for yearly comparisons. The derivatives exposure rates for the 
biggest US banks were calculated by dividing the total amount they held in derivatives 
by the total amount they held in assets. This established how many times more value 
they had in derivatives compared to their assets. The balance sheet and stock chart of 
Deutsche Bank were also examined in order to gather information on Europe’s version 
of a too big to fail bank in terms of its derivatives exposure and market volatility. Alt-
hough this is only one European bank, it was outlined as an example primarily in order 
to compare systemic risk between the US and the EU derivatives markets. It was 
tempting to extend this analysis to other European banks as well. However, this was 
not done because it would have strayed the focus away from the meeting the research 
objectives.  
 
The data for the biggest US banks by derivatives exposure was presented using sepa-
rate table charts instead of one or two collective line charts in order to ensure clarity 
and comparability. As the tables demonstrate, the rankings of the biggest banks 
changed on a yearly basis and so did their derivatives holdings. It generally would have 
been impossible to demonstrate changes in both rankings and derivatives exposures in 
a trend data chart. A collection of table charts was therefore seen as the most suitable 
data presentation tool in order to ensure accuracy for the kind of data that was ana-
lysed. However, the author felt that trends should also be demonstrated using the data 
that was collected and analysed. Bar charts are often the most accurate representa-
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tions of the highest and lowest values, as the height or length of each bar can be used 
to represent the frequency of occurrence (Saunders et al., 2012). Therefore a bar chart 
was created in order to delineate the change in the derivatives exposure of Goldman 
Sachs, which was identified as the most systemically risky US bank based on its deriv-
atives exposure ratio.  
3.3 Limitations and Areas for Future Research  
 
It quickly became evident that various limitations existed for this research project. First 
and foremost, since derivatives markets are global, disentangling the impacts of in-
creased regulation in the US and the EU proved to be a challenge. This is due to the 
fact that in most statistics, the derivatives market is treated as a global entity, which is 
why the impacts of increased regulation cannot be viewed in isolation. Hence, factors 
such as trading volumes are not reported on a country-by-country basis, and are in-
stead measured in global terms. In addition to the US and the EU derivatives markets, 
there are other global players, for example in the Asian and emerging markets. Alt-
hough these markets are only indirectly impacted by these regulations, it means that 
statistical data, such as an increase in global derivatives trading volumes, does not 
give a specific indication as to how the US and the EU regulations have impacted the 
market. As a result, finding correlations was challenging.  
 
Another major limitation identified during the research is that MiFID II will not come into 
effect until 2018, which is why its impacts cannot be concretely tested until a few years 
after its implementation. Therefore, only the immediate impacts of EMIR and Dodd-
Frank could be tested whereas the impacts of MiFID II could only be forecasted and 
speculated. MiFID II has caused considerable uncertainty concerning how it will affect 
the market in practice and the initial impact will not be clear until the regulation has 
been implemented. If the creation of multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) for equities 
under the original directive is any indication, the full implications cannot be understood 
until years after these regulations have come into force and market participants have 
had the time to react to them (Achkar, 2016). With MiFID, MTFs were set up with the 
objective of lowering transaction costs and increasing liquidity in equity markets and 
however successful MTFs were at this, it was not the only impact they had on the mar-
ket or its participants (Achkar, 2016). In fact, trading times and execution size plunged 
and variations in pricing across venues ended up being exploited, which is why it is not 
a huge leap to suggest that the introduction of organised trading facilities (OTFs) by 
MiFID II will have impacts on the same scale (Achkar, 2016). Nevertheless, the conse-
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quences of MiFID II cannot be put to the test just yet, which is why this has been identi-
fied as an area for future research.  
4 Results  
The literature review has identified in gaps in determining the degrees of increased 
transparency. According to quantitative data in the literature, Dodd-Frank has signifi-
cantly increased the clearing and reporting of derivatives and for instance SEFs have 
been created in order to extend transparency. While this indicates that Dodd-Frank has 
succeeded in creating some transparency, it cannot be used as the only measure to 
define whether or not the derivatives markets are truly transparent. Consequently this 
chapter will test the transparency of derivatives trading and clearing to the general pub-
lic and in doing so will compare and contrast the current level of transparency in the US 
and the EU.  Moreover, whereas the literature review mostly focused on the concentra-
tion of derivatives, this chapter will outline how exposed to derivatives the too big to fail 
banks are and establish trends in derivatives holdings between 2009 and 2015. This 
chapter will test these issues using methods outlined in the methodology chapter. 
4.1 Identifying the Leading Derivatives Exchanges in the US and the EU 
 
As the literature review has established, the US and the EU jurisdictions account for 
approximately 80 per-cent of the global derivatives markets. While the absolute market 
size for derivatives remains under debate, with estimations ranging from $553 trillion to 
$1.2 quadrillion, the US and the EU nevertheless account for the majority of this. 
Therefore their regulatory oversight has significant impacts on the entire industry, as 
both can be said to pave the way for global players. Hence it is crucial to determine 
where the most derivatives are traded by volume and how these entities have dealt 
with increased regulatory requirements. As Figure 1 demonstrates, Eurex Exchange is 
the largest European derivatives exchange by volume, with 2097.97 million contracts 
traded in 2014. In terms of derivatives exchanges headquartered in the US; CME 
Group and Intercontinental Exchange are the largest ones with approximately 3442.77 
million and 2276.17 million contracts traded in 2014, respectively. CME Group, Inter-
continental Exchange and Eurex constitute the top three derivatives exchanges by vol-
ume not only within the US and the EU but also globally with roughly 7820 million con-
tracts traded. Given that these three derivatives exchanges accounted for approximate-
ly 7820 million derivatives contracts in 2014, the measures they have adopted towards 
increasing transparency and mitigating systemic risk can be seen as indicative for the 
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whole derivatives market. Figure 1 also shows the volume of other large derivatives 
exchanges based in the US and the EU, the majority of which are headquartered in the 
US. Within the context of the largest derivatives exchanges by volume, US-based ex-
changes accounted for 7380.77 million contracts, whereas exchanges based in Europe 
only accounted for 3425.46 million; indicating that the US markets are approximately 
double the size of those in Europe.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Largest US and European Derivatives Exchanges in 2014 by Number of 
Contracts Traded (in millions) 
 
4.2 Measuring the Transparency of Derivatives Exchanges 
 
Now that the three largest derivatives exchanges by volume have been identified, it is 
useful to evaluate how they have succeeded in terms of risk mitigation and transparen-
cy. All transactions executed on Eurex Exchange will be cleared through Eurex Clear-
ing, which delivers clearing services for listed products in addition to OTC. In order to 
increase transparency, Eurex discloses up-to-date information for markets in which 
Eurex Clearing acts as a central counterparty clearing house (CCP). Figure 2 shows 
the increase in both the notional value of interest rate swaps and in the amount of 
cleared trades. These are clearly correlated, with the number of cleared trades increas-
ing as notional values go up, indicating a positive trend in both the trading and clearing 
of OTC derivatives. The first clearing obligation on OTC interest rate swaps was not 
adopted until August 2015 and did not enter into force until 21 December 2015 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2016). This shows that even without the obligation, Eurex has 
cleared trades, albeit on a very small scale.  
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Figure 2 – Eurex Cleared Interest Rate Swaps 2011-2015 
 
Eurex is not limited to only providing monthly statistics but also discloses daily statistics 
comprising the number of traded contracts in addition to the daily volume for both the 
current month and year. Furthermore, Eurex also discloses the open interest figures 
from the previous day. Figure 3 shows the kind of information Eurex discloses publical-
ly on a daily basis. In addition to traded contracts, open interest and volume in EUR, 
the daily statistics for interest rate derivatives cover traded contracts (month), traded 
contracts (year), traded contracts (monthly average), traded contracts (yearly average), 
volume in EUR (month), volume in EUR (year) and open interest rate in EUR (previous 
day). This kind of data is available on equity derivatives, equity index derivatives, divi-
dend derivatives, volatility index derivatives, ETF & ETC derivatives, commodity deriva-
tives and foreign exchange derivatives to name a few. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that Eurex is relatively transparent although MiFID II has not yet been implemented 
across the EU financial markets.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Eurex Interest Rate Derivatives Daily Statistics 28/04/2016 
 
The two largest US-based derivatives exchanges: CME Group and Intercontinental 
Exchange, however, do not publish up-to-date statistics with the same level of trans-
parency as Eurex.  Figure 4 shows that ICE only discloses the settle price and change 
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for the majority of futures. In some cases the daily price range, total volume and total 
spread were disclosed, as Figure 5 demonstrates. The total number of derivatives con-
tracts is not published and the data that is available to the outside world is extremely 
scarce. For example, OTC trading is not mentioned in any shape or form in ICE’s sta-
tistical data. ICE claims to clear over 6 million derivatives contracts on a daily basis and 
in 2013 led the CDS clearing business with $7.7 trillion in notional amount, which indi-
cates a 25.3 per-cent rise from $6.1 trillion in 2012 (ICE, 2016). However, due to an 
evident lack of transparency, there is no other choice than to take ICE’s word for this.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 – ICE Futures Daily Markets Report (for Cocoa) 28/04/2016  
Source: ICE 2016 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – ICE Futures Daily Markets Report (for Coffee) C 28/04/2016  
Source: ICE 2016 
 
By contrast, CME Group discloses slightly more daily statistical data in terms of volume 
and overall combined total (see Figure 6). For instance, OTC cleared-only forward 
swaps statistical data is published on a daily basis. In addition, volume, open interest 
and change are disclosed. Although it can be argued that the information provided by 
CME Group is more descriptive than that of ICE, Eurex remains the only derivatives 
exchange out of the three that discloses the full amount of traded contracts. According 
to CME Group (2016), volume figures are reported across different visions in order to 
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provide ‘’an instant grasp of market activity.’’ ClearPort, which is CME Group’s clearing 
service for OTC markets, represents the total number of transactions that were com-
pleted outside of Globex, which is CME’s electronic trading platform, or Open Outcry, 
which is CME Group’s trading floor (CME Group, 2016). Overall, although the US fi-
nancial markets are more advanced, as proven by the literature, and most of the re-
quired legislation is already in place, the US still seems to experience a continuing lack 
of transparency when it comes to derivatives trading and disclosing information.  
 
  
Figure 6 – CME Group Daily Exchange 28/04/2016  
Source: CME Group 2016 
 
4.3 Systemic Risk: TBTF  
 
The threat of systemic risk is most often associated with the too big to fail (TBTF) 
banks, as identified in the literature review, because governments cannot allow for the-
se banks to go bust as it would bring down the entire financial system. The literature 
review has determined that that high levels of notional values of derivatives equal to 
high systemic risk, signifying that these variables are correlated. Given that the biggest 
banks account for the majority of notional derivatives amounts, it is therefore crucial to 
examine trend data regarding their exposure to derivatives (see Figures 7-13) in order 
to determine if Dodd-Frank has succeeded in its stated objective.  
 
Figure 7 – Derivatives Exposure of the Five Largest US Banks (in billions $) in 2009 
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Figure 8 – Derivatives Exposure of the Five Largest US Banks (in billions $) in 2010 
 
Figure 9 – Derivatives Exposure of the Five Largest US Banks (in billions $) in 2011 
 
JPMorgan Chase, Citibank (Citigroup), Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Wells Fargo 
and HSBC are the six largest US banks with the most derivatives. For this study, the 
five biggest banks by the amount held in derivatives were examined, hence HSBC and 
Wells Fargo alternate for the position of the fifth largest US bank over the period stud-
ied. Figures 7-13 show how much the five biggest banks have held in derivatives and 
assets in addition to their exposure to derivatives. The derivatives exposure ratio was 
calculated by dividing the amount of total derivatives by total assets, thereby establish-
ing how much more the banks held in derivatives compared to their total assets. The 
largest derivatives holder over the entire period studied; from 2009 until 2015 is 
JPMorgan Chase. In 2015 JPMorgan Chase held approximately $51 billion in deriva-
tives, which is nearly 27 times its total assets (see Figure 13). Citibank National has 
approximately $46 billion in derivatives, meaning that it its derivatives exposure is 35 
times the amount of total assets. With a significantly lower derivatives exposure rate, 
Bank of America has $26 billion in derivatives and a derivatives exposure rate of 16. 
Wells Fargo stands out as the only bank with a reasonable derivatives exposure, as the 
amount of total derivatives is “only” 3.6 times the amount of its total assets. However, 
the real focus of derivatives exposures is obviously Goldman Sachs with nearly $41 
billion in derivatives, which is approximately 305 times its total assets. Moreover, Wells 
Fargo is clearly the least exposed of the five. However, if the other four, JPMorgan 
Chase, Citibank National, Goldman Sachs and Bank of America, were to fail with ap-
proximately $170 billion in derivatives, between the five banks alone, this would have 
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significant consequences and even the measures in Dodd-Frank most likely could not 
prevent the systemic collapse that would ensue if one bank went bust.   
 Figure 10 – Derivatives Exposure of the Five Largest US Banks (in billions $) in 2012 
 
Figure 11 – Derivatives Exposure of the Five Largest US Banks (in billions $) in 2013
 
Figure 12 – Derivatives Exposure of the Five Largest US Banks (in billions $) in 2014 
 
Figure 13 – Derivatives Exposure of the Five Largest US Banks (in billions $) in 2015 
 
Goldman Sachs has been identified as the bank with the highest derivatives exposure 
rate between 2009 and 2015, as Figures 7-13 indicate. In 2009, its exposure rate was 
457, which increased to 476 by the next year, which is when Dodd-Frank was imple-
mented. In 2011, Goldman Sachs held $44.2 billion derivatives, which is 426 times its 
total assets, marking a slight increase from the two previous years. In 2012, the deriva-
tives exposure rate dramatically decreased to 348. The 2010-2012 period captures the 
initial impact of Dodd-Frank and increased scrutiny towards derivatives concentration, 
which most likely explain the decrease. However, in 2013, the exposure rate increased 
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to 460. The exposure to derivatives of Goldman Sachs has nevertheless decreased 
since then, and was the lowest in 6 years in 2015. It can therefore be concluded that 
while Goldman Sachs is headed in the right direction, as demonstrated by Figure 14, 
its derivatives exposure is dangerously high especially compared to the other large 
banks in the US. In the context of derivatives exposure, Goldman Sachs is still too sys-
temically important both globally and within the US, signifying that Dodd-Frank has 
failed in this respect. As the trend data over the studied period indicates (see Figures 
7-13), Dodd-Frank has done very little in order to reduce derivatives concentration and 
big banks control virtually as much derivatives as they did prior to Dodd-Frank. 
 
 
Figure 14 – Goldman Sachs Derivatives Exposure 2009-2015  
 
In the literature review, Deutsche Bank was identified as Europe’s version of the too big 
to fail, and JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank account for approximately 20 per-cent of 
global derivatives exposure. In 2014 the overleveraged Deutsche Bank had approxi-
mately €52 trillion in derivatives (see Figure 15), rivalling JPMorgan for the largest no-
tional value in derivatives. The exposure to derivatives these two banks have along 
with the other too big to fail can undoubtedly be associated with systemic risk. System-
ic risk can especially be viewed as a threat in Europe considering the economic situa-
tion across the continent and the state of European banks post-crises. Furthermore, 
figure 16 delineates the stock price for Deutsche Bank over the past 5 years, from 2012 
until 2016. While Deutsche Bank has not experienced a vast amount of volatility in this 
respect its stock price has significantly gone down from 2012. In fact, Deutsche Bank’s 
stock price is now the lowest it has been in the past five years and meanwhile it has a 
high exposure to derivatives. While this does not singlehandedly mean that the bank is 
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on its way to a bailout, it signifies that the combination of precarious market conditions 
and being overexposed to derivatives does not contribute to mitigating systemic risk.  
 
 
Figure 15 – Deutsche Bank Notional Amount of Derivatives 2014 (in €) 
Source: Deutsche Bank AG 2015 
 
Figure 16 – Deutsche Bank AG Stock Chart (5 years)  
Source: Google Finance / Yahoo Finance / Reuters (April 2016)  
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4.4 Summary 
 
The aim of this chapter was to fill gaps identified in the literature review on how the US 
and the EU have increased transparency and mitigated systemic risk. Based on the 
data analysis, it can be concluded that the US has more or less failed in both respects 
although change for the better can be observed. Europe has proven to be relatively 
transparent although MiFID II will not be implemented until 2018 and most of EMIR has 
only been in force for a few years. However, Europe too has been unsuccessful in re-
ducing systemic risk effectively. This chapter thus corroborates the view gathered from 
the literature review, which is that while the US is ahead of the EU in several regulatory 
aspects after the 2008 financial crisis, it has not necessarily succeeded in practice. The 
following chapter will contain more discussion and the final concluding thoughts around 
this topic.  
5 Conclusions and Discussion  
 
This thesis set out to determine if the US is ahead of the EU in terms of increasing 
transparency and reducing systemic risk in the post-financial crisis derivatives market. 
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted the opacity of OTC derivatives markets in addition 
to the excessive and insufficiently restricted derivatives concentration and exposure of 
the too big to fail banks. Although MiFID II will not come into force until 2018 and EMIR 
is relatively new, evidence has found that Europe; even with an incomplete derivatives 
regime, can be concluded to be more transparent than the US, where Dodd-Frank has 
been in force for as many as six years. As both the literature review and data analysis 
have demonstrated, US-based derivatives exchanges are not required to report the full 
size of trades. Reporting the full size of trades should be a relatively elementary and 
straightforward way to increase transparency, which is why it stood out as a key issue 
to be tested. It is argued that the US is therefore approaching this issue more gradually 
than the EU. Nevertheless, it should not be too demanding to disclose this information 
to the general public and it would significantly support the extension of transparency. 
However, even without MiFID II in place, Eurex, the leading Europe-based derivatives 
exchange, reports the full size of trades along with a significant amount of more infor-
mation about its trading and clearing activities than the two global leaders, CME Group 
and Intercontinental Exchange, which are both based in the US. There are clearly other 
existing factors that have not yet been investigated but this analysis would suggest that 
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US derivatives exchanges are not sufficiently transparent and therefore have not suc-
ceeded in increasing transparency.  
 
It has been argued that systemic risk is one of the most crucial issues during and after 
the financial crisis due to the domino effect across all counterparties should one coun-
terparty default on its obligations. However, both the US and the EU have more or less 
failed to reduce systemic risk. One of the stated objectives of Dodd-Frank was to ad-
dress the too big to fail banks. However, this study has demonstrated that there has 
virtually been no real impact on reducing the derivatives concentration and exposure. 
EMIR too aims to prevent systemic risks in the financial markets and the clearing re-
quirement of EMIR is anticipated to mitigate the risks of the domino effect through cen-
tralising risk within Central Counterparties. However, the derivatives exposure of 
Deutsche Bank would suggest that the EU has failed to reduce systemic risk. Although 
there are other banks that have not yet been investigated, the derivatives exposure of 
Deutsche Bank alone is sufficient to conclude that the EU has been unsuccessful at 
mitigating systemic risk. Although centralising risk within Central Counterparties un-
doubtedly means that the EU recognises the risk and aims to mitigate it, one can make 
the case that this measure is not effective enough on its own. Therefore it is not far-
reaching to suggest that the EU’s lack of regulatory action towards excessive deriva-
tives exposure may encourage other European banks to become extremely exposed to 
derivatives as well. This could therefore result in a similar situation to the one in the US 
with a massive concentration of derivatives held by big banks that are essentially too 
big to punish.  
 
The US effectively has a head start, and is ahead of Europe in the clearing mandate 
and electronic trading, both of which have significantly supported equity derivative vol-
umes. However, it has been argued that the US has been unable to capture the bene-
fits of its first-mover advantage due to a lack of harmonisation and cooperation with the 
European Union. While this is certainly one contributing factor, it is not the primary 
cause for the failure of Dodd-Frank. Furthermore, the harmonisation of the US and the 
EU regimes should improve transparency considerably whilst bringing an end to both 
regulatory arbitrage and double compliance. As long as significant differences between 
the US and EU regulators persist, there will always be a race to the bottom. When 
Dodd-Frank’s regulatory requirements were too much, investors went to Europe. With 
MiFID II, investors have an incentive to go to the US where the regime is more lenient 
than in Europe. With the harmonisation of the US-EU derivatives oversight, both re-
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gimes are expected to benefit from increased clearing and trading in addition to market 
transparency.  
 
This thesis has established that the global reach and importance of the US and the EU 
derivatives markets is notable, as the top three global derivatives exchanges are in the 
US and the EU, and the American and European jurisdictions account for approximate-
ly 80 per-cent of global derivatives markets. Although differences in the US and the EU 
derivatives regimes have resulted in regulatory arbitrage, market fragmentation and the 
threat of double compliance, the harmonisation of both oversights is expected to end 
the trans-Atlantic dispute concerning derivatives and pave the way for other areas of 
regulatory harmonisation. The US-EU harmonisation is generally expected to have 
positive outcomes for market player, however, without knowledge of further detail or 
the initial impact, this cannot be tested. This can therefore be identified as an area of 
future research.  
 
This thesis aimed to determine whether or not Dodd-Frank, EMIR and MiFID II have 
the potential to bring the US and the EU one step closer to extending transparency 
requirements and reducing systemic risk. There are clearly different views as to what 
extent Dodd-Frank has failed in the US but it has been established that it more or less 
has. By contrast, in the EU, EMIR has generally made progress towards meeting the 
2009 G-20 Pittsburgh commitments. However, this study has established that the 
measures introduced by EMIR are not fully able to meet these objectives. Neverthe-
less, the introduction of MiFID II in 2018 is expected to introduce a more rigorous and 
demanding regulatory regime across Europe. Therefore the EU has the potential to 
outpace the US in achieving these objectives. Although the EU is playing catch-up with 
the US in increasing transparency and mitigating systemic risk, this study has estab-
lished that the EU is not as far behind as one would initially assume.  
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Appendix 1 – G-20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit September 24-25, 
2009  
 
Strengthening the International Financial Regulatory System  
 
13. As we encourage the resumption of lending to households and businesses, we 
must take care not to spur a return of the practices that led to the crisis. The steps we 
are taking here, when fully implemented, will result in a fundamentally stronger financial 
system than existed prior to the crisis. If we all act together, financial institutions will 
have stricter rules for risk-taking, governance that aligns compensation with long-term 
performance, and greater transparency in their operations. All firms whose failure could 
pose a risk to financial stability must be subject to consistent, consolidated supervision 
and regulation with high standards. Our reform is multi-faceted but at its core must be 
stronger capital standards, complemented by clear incentives to mitigate excessive 
risk-taking practices. Capital allows banks to withstand those losses that inevitably will 
come. It, together with more powerful tools for governments to wind down firms that 
fail, helps us hold firms accountable for the risks that they take. Building on their Decla-
ration on Further Steps to Strengthen the International Financial System, we call on our 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to reach agreement on an international 
framework of reform in the following critical areas:  
 
• Building high quality capital and mitigating pro-cyclicality: We commit to devel-
oping by end-2010 internationally agreed rules to improve both the quantity and 
quality of bank capital and to discourage excessive leverage. These rules will 
be phased in as financial conditions improve and economic recovery is assured, 
with the aim of implementation by end-2012. The national implementation of 
higher level and better quality capital requirements, counter-cyclical capital 
buffers, higher capital requirements for risky products and off-balance sheet ac-
tivities, as elements of the Basel II Capital Framework, together with strength-
ened liquidity risk requirements and forward-looking provisioning, will reduce in-
centives for banks to take excessive risks and create a financial system better 
prepared to withstand adverse shocks. We welcome the key measures recently 
agreed by the oversight body of the Basel Committee to strengthen the supervi-
sion and regulation of the banking sector. We support the introduction of a lev-
erage ratio as a supplementary measure to the Basel II risk-based framework 
with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment based on appropriate review and 
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calibration. To ensure comparability, the details of the leverage ratio will be 
harmonized internationally, fully adjusting for differences in accounting. All ma-
jor G20 financial centers commit to have adopted the Basel II Capital Frame-
work by 2011.  
 
• Reforming compensation practices to support financial stability: Excessive 
compensation in the financial sector has both reflected and encouraged exces-
sive risk taking. Reforming compensation policies and practices is an essential 
part of our effort to increase financial stability. We fully endorse the implementa-
tion standards of the FSB aimed at aligning compensation with long-term value 
creation, not excessive risk-taking, including by (i) avoiding multi-year guaran-
teed bonuses; (ii) requiring a significant portion of variable compensation to be 
deferred, tied to performance and subject to appropriate clawback and to be 
vested in the form of stock or stock-like instruments, as long as these create in-
centives aligned with long-term value creation and the time horizon of risk; (iii) 
ensuring that compensation for senior executives and other employees having 
a material impact on the firm’s risk exposure align with performance and risk; 
(iv) making firms’ compensation policies and structures transparent through dis-
closure requirements; (v) limiting variable compensation as a percentage of to-
tal net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital 
base; and (vi) ensuring that compensation committees overseeing compensa-
tion policies are able to act independently. Supervisors should have the respon-
sibility to review firms’ compensation policies and structures with institutional 
and systemic risk in mind and, if necessary to offset additional risks, apply cor-
rective measures, such as higher capital requirements, to those firms that fail to 
implement sound compensation policies and practices. Supervisors should 
have the ability to modify compensation structures in the case of firms that fail 
or require extraordinary public intervention. We call on firms to implement these 
sound compensation practices immediately. We task the FSB to monitor the 
implementation of FSB standards and propose additional measures as required 
by March 2010. 
 
• Improving over-the-counter derivatives markets: All standardized OTC de-
rivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading 
platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties 
by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to 
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trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to 
higher capital requirements. We ask the FSB and its relevant members to 
assess regularly implementation and whether it is sufficient to improve 
transparency in the derivatives markets, mitigate systemic risk, and pro-
tect against market abuse.  
 
• Addressing cross-border resolutions and systemically important financial 
institutions by end-2010: Systemically important financial firms should 
develop internationally consistent firm-specific contingency and resolu-
tion plans. Our authorities should establish crisis management groups for 
the major cross-border firms and a legal framework for crisis intervention 
as well as improve information sharing in times of stress. We should de-
velop resolution tools and frameworks for the effective resolution of fi-
nancial groups to help mitigate the disruption of financial institution fail-
ures and reduce moral hazard in the future. Our prudential standards for 
systemically important institutions should be commensurate with the 
costs of their failure. The FSB should propose by the end of October 2010 
possible measures including more intensive supervision and specific ad-
ditional capital, liquidity, and other prudential requirements.  
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Appendix 2 – Statista: Largest Derivatives Exchanges Worldwide in 2014, by 
Number of Contracts Traded  
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